Abstract: For some years, a growing crowd of 'cosmopolitan' Left-liberal scholars and intellectuals have been taking aim at the nation state, holding it responsible for numerous grave problems facing Europe and the wider world, ranging from growing anti-immigrant sentiments to the absence of a counterweight to US neoconservative unilateralism. In this view, 'more Europe', as in more supranational EU integration, is said to be the key solution, paving the way for a progressive, human rights-based 'cosmopolitan Europe' capable of transcending the vices of national self-interest. This article offers a critique of such an EUbased cosmopolitan promise, focusing primarily on asylum policy. Since there has been an increased EU involvement in asylum policy in recent years, it makes for an ideal context to discuss and 'test' the cosmopolitan 'more Europe' thesis. It is argued that, while there are as many good reasons to remain critical of the nation state as there are injustices committed in its name, recognition of this fact cannot be allowed to spill over uncritically into the nowadays fashionable contention that progress will automatically result from diminishing national sovereignty and the shift of policy-making to the EU level. As the case of 'Europeanised' asylum policy demonstrates, there are no guarantees whatsoever to that effect.
debate.' It seemed, Bildt went on, 'as if South-East Asia was situated just east of Stockholm' and 'Southern Africa just south of Malmö'.
i The greatest scandal of all for Bildt -who is today the foreign minister in the government -was thus to be found in the refusal on the part of consecutive postwar social democratic governments to anchor Swedish foreign policy unequivocally in the western camp.
That such a camp was not only seen as a worldly political, economic and security community but also as a cultural and moral community, lent a novel sense of zeal to the struggle of the Swedish
Right. There was something culturally repugnant to the Right to hear Social Democrats 'speak of "Sweden and Europe" in the same manner as they spoke of "Sweden and Africa"'. ii In the eyes of the Right, Sweden's social democracy can thus be said to have stood for a perverted cosmopolitanism -which extended moral community to humanity as a whole, instead of abiding by the rules and reserving it for Sweden's fellow Europeans and westerners. Bildt and his growing following were indignantly determined to put an end to the allegedly preposterous development in which, from the 1970s, 'Swedish politicians became increasingly knowledgeable about development in Namibia, while fewer and fewer had any contacts or could assess development in western Europe'.
iii For the Swedish Right, such a curiosity about African affairs was considered to be no less than treasonous to the European spirit. Obviously, a key part of the solution for the Right, but also for the new breed of so-called renewer Social Democrats -who were making headway in the party in the early 1990s -was to be found in Swedish membership of the EU. Such a move was meant to act as a restraint on Sweden's bad habits of international solidarity and relative independence from the western powers. iv By the same token, Europe would be the corrective to Sweden's morally and culturally distorted cosmopolitism; it would serve to disarm the moral superpower, reducing its striking power to that of a regular European country.
From today's vantage point, there can be no denying that the struggle to reroute Swedish foreign policy has been successful. Under social democratic leadership, Sweden became a member of the EU in 1995, joined with other EU members in support of NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999
and, today, Sweden participates in the NATO-led war in Afghanistan. It would be 'natural' for Sweden, says the current Swedish defence minister, to join NATO in the not-so-long run. In addition, Swedish governments no longer spend time improving their knowledge of Namibia; on the contrary, Sweden now has a minister for development assistance who refers to African nations as 'Hottentot countries'. v It goes without saying that the Swedish prime minister no longer compares US war crimes to those of Guernica, Sharpeville and Treblinka -as Olof Palme did in the 1970s. And the in-house epithet that used to be the White House's way of referring to Palme -'that Swedish asshole' -is no longer applied.
vi
Welcoming Iraqi refugees?
Sweden's reputation as a moral superpower never faded completely and has lingered on, despite attempts to consign it to the dustbin of history through But Germany was not alone in deciding to leave behind the lessons of the past. Indeed, it was actually the last to do so; other EU governments had already produced asylum policies and rhetoric which did not betray the slightest remorse over their own behaviour during the refugee crisis of the 1930s. Germany thus decided to turn its back on history in order to emerge as a fully-fledged member of the new Europe. Interior minister Schäuble's explanation of this decision to join Europe reads like a lesson in the art of realpolitik: 'If we change our constitution, … we, and not the others, would profit from our geographical location. Then our European neighbours, and not only we, would quickly want to find a joint solution.' xviii
Reducing asylum numbers through European integration
It hardly needs to be mentioned that Schäuble's prophecy came true. During the past two decades, the search for common European 'solutions' to the 'refugee problem' has been fairly successful,
given both EU governments and Brussels' explicit purpose of considerably reducing the number of asylum seekers entering the EU. Since the 1980s, practically all EU members have been doing their utmost to secure a bad international reputation for themselves over asylum. As illustrated by Germany in the early 1990s
and Sweden more recently, a good asylum reputation in the EU is seen by governments as no less than a betrayal. This trend does not result from a series of independent decisions by individual member-state governments but, rather, from the process of EU harmonisation and cooperation. As such, the project of realising each and every member state's objective of reducing the number of asylum seekers has, from the outset, been abetted and rendered more effective by European 
Testing the thesis: the Europeanisation of asylum policy
One way to 'test' the cosmopolitan 'more Europe' thesis is to return to the question of asylum policy. Since some of the most conspicuous victims of national chauvinism and sovereignty have been refugees, immigrants and minorities, there should be, according to the cosmopolitan contention, a gradual improvement in asylum policy in tandem with increased EU involvement.
However, no such progressive dynamic has come to fruition in the land of Europe. Rather, the exact opposite has taken place.
A qualification needs to be added here concerning the fact that many cosmopolitans are not content with merely more European cooperation in general. For them, a truly post-national cosmopolitanism demands the erection of a supranational regime in the EU, one that elevates policy, decision-making and law above the national level and thus above the lowly logic of national self-interest. This approach has had a particular resonance amongst those who have been alarmed at the restrictive intergovernmental cooperation on asylum and migration policy in the EU from the 1980s onwards. With the important exception of the policy of free movement for member-state nationals, the supranational level was not entrusted with any competence in asylum and migration policy until the late 1990s -this made the intermittent EU harmonisation of this area of policy the sole prerogative of the member states and their intergovernmental cooperation. Due to migration policy's intimate relation to the very definition and logic of the sovereign nation state (that is, to borders, security, citizenship, identity, and so on), migration was often alleged to be (and still is described as) a 'sensitive' area for national governments, one they 'jealously guarded' against any supranational meddling.
However, much to many analysts' surprise, a gradual supranationalisation of asylum and migration policy in the EU did take place -with the Amsterdam Treaty (ratified in 1999) and the EU's
Tampere Programme (agreed in 1999) paving the way. These landmark agreements were received fairly positively by many of those who had earlier been worried by the detrimental consequences of intergovernmental cooperation. Many suggested that the introduction of supranationalism would beget a less restrictive and more human rights-based approach to asylum in the EU. Trimming the national influence on what was always a delicate issue for the nation state, it was argued, held out the possibility of subduing the inherent nationalist and xenophobic impulse. On this view, which was put forward by many prominent NGOs working in the field of asylum and migrants' rights, supranationalisation could produce a counterweight to the kind of intergovernmental decisionmaking that was built around the lowest common denominators of each nation. For example, ECRE, one of the principal migration NGOs, saw the supranationalisation of immigration and asylum policy 'as a favourable development, as more progressive, and as a positive restraining force on member state actions that have tenuous regard for international legal standards'. The promise of protection delivered by the EU Heads of State at the Tampere Summit in 1999 left many of us full of hope that harmonization would bring better protection for persons fleeing persecution … ECRE's assessment finds that the EU has adopted a package of laws that will not ensure that asylum seekers and refugees will get effective protection across the whole of the newly enlarged European Union.
xxxviii Contrary to what many had predicted or hoped, supranationalisation has so far not reversed the intergovernmental 'race to the bottom' set in train from the 1980s. Nor has the increased mandate of the supranational European Commission shown any sign of producing a more human rightsoriented asylum policy. Commission proposals and initiatives, from above the nation state, are essentially as restrictive and security-obsessed as their national counterparts. Indeed, the Commission's 'vision' for a European asylum policy is a future in which practically all routes to asylum in the EU have been sealed up. To be sure, the Commission admits that a very small number of what it refers to as 'spontaneous arrivals' will continue to seek asylum in the EU. But the general rule is that practically all refugees will be confined to 'protection zones' in the 'regions of origin'.
While the Commission is clear that, within the foreseeable future, it is not realistic -due, inter alia, to a lack of resources -to expect such regional solutions to offer anything like satisfactory protection and social conditions for refugees, it is nonetheless adamant that the EU should quickly proceed to implementing the instruments needed in and around the EU territory to realise this unrealistic plan -hence, for example, further militarisation of external borders and stronger utilisation of forced return instruments. The Commission has suggested that the EU might decide to admit a select small cohort of refugees from these regional protection zones, not to alleviate the global refugee crisis (the number of those resettled in the EU is projected to be very small) but to boost public relations and fight racism! As the Commission asserts:
[T]he managed arrival of persons in need of international protection would also constitute an efficient tool in combating sentiments of racism and xenophobia, as the public support for those positively screened outside the EU and then resettled in the EU is likely to be increased. This is significantly different to the current situation where a majority of the persons applying for asylum are not found to require any form of international protection. The lack of clarity in terms of public perception of this group threatens the credibility of the institution of asylum.
xxxix In addition to this, the Commission seems unable to emphasise enough that '[a] policy on returns or effective removal from the territory is an absolute necessity for the credibility of the common asylum system'. xl A major reason for the 'forced return' of rejected asylum seekers, it argues, is that this can 'help to ensure public acceptance for more openness towards new legal immigrants against the background of more open admission policies particularly for labour migrants'.
Commission is thus very keen to use returns policy to send a message of resolve to the general public, which is imagined to be hankering for reassurance that the authorities will crack down relentlessly on 'bogus' asylum seekers.
xli The
Testing the thesis: the Europeanisation of integration policy
As for immigrant 'integration', here too the supranation has been eager to embrace many national sentiments and policy measures to ensure that already marginalised minorities, particularly The dark side of the 'old' migration strategy includes the fact of integration problems, often taking the form of the deliberate denial of Europe's founding values and principles. Until a few years ago, our chosen multicultural approach allowed some cultural and religious groups to pursue an aggressive strategy against our values. The targets of this ill-conceived 'attack'
were individual rights, equality of gender, respect for women and monogamy. We have to combat this dangerous attitude, which can destroy the fabric of our societies, and we have to work hard to build up and pursue a positive integration approach. All too often we neglect to strengthen our fundamental roots, the principles we inherited from our Founding Fathers. As with asylum policy or foreign policy, there are no guarantees that integration policy will take on a more human face just because it gets elevated to the supranational level. Rather, the outcome of any such conversions will always be an open question, the answer to which ultimately depends, not on the metaphysical qualities we wish to assign a priori to the nation state or the European supranation, but on the concrete political interests and leanings of the participant actors and forces.
To cosmopolitan reasoning, however, there is little room for such shilly-shallying. For many within this school of thought, a major intellectual task is the veneration of the EU's past achievements and the presentation of hopeful visions for the EU's future. Given, moreover, that this enterprise is founded on a passionate conviction that the EU project will eventually yield a progressive cosmopolitan turn, it cannot afford to be ambivalent about the benevolence of the EU project's founding intentions or its teleology; all of which suggests an ironic similarity with nationalist intellectuals' refusal in earlier periods to question the national project. Today's cosmopolitans commonly assert that Islamophobia can only can be tackled above the nation since, as Beck asserts, it is 'utterly un-European' to be anti-Muslim. In sharp contrast to the nation state, says Beck, '[r]adical openness is a defining feature of the European project and is the real secret of its success'. xlvi Yet, the cosmopolitans do not explain how such 'radical openness' actually manifests itself in more concrete terms and how it serves to mitigate the current plight of Muslims.
A European hypernationalism
Given the countless atrocities committed in the name of the nation and national sovereignty, there is good reason to adopt a critical approach towards national projects; and, needless to say, intellectuals and scholars have been industrious in pursuing such criticism in recent decades. But it is a serious mistake to see this critical task as marking the end of history and, from there, simply to assume that human rights and cosmopolitan values will automatically fare better once national sovereignty recedes and policy-making moves to the EU level. For those sporting a progressive and cosmopolitan outlook, it borders on self-deception. But it also verges on transcendentalism in its sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit, supposition and hope that the displacement of national sovereignty, through, for example, the EU's supranational regime, also leads to the transcending, or at least alleviation, of its vices. However, rather than corroborating the thesis that supranationalism and the gradual curtailment of national sovereignty in the area of asylum policy have served to tame the big bad wolf of national self-interest and its hereditary xenophobic impulses, an examination of recent developments suggests that supranational solutions have been agreed on precisely because governments believe they offer a more efficient way of advancing their national (and indeed anti-cosmopolitan) interests of, inter alia, shutting out asylum seekers. A consensus exists amongst member-state governments that holds their common immigration 'problems' to be more effectively solved by means of supranational policy; and the European Commission is ready to adapt itself to this consensus. This state of affairs suggests that national governments do not 'jealously guard' national sovereignty.
Had national sovereignty really constituted the 'sanctity' that countless scholars argue, there would have been no EU in the first place, no single market and certainly no swapping of national currencies for a common currency -so much for the national currency being one of the crown jewels of national sovereignty. Rather, national governments guard their political interests by dressing them up as national interests. When such political interests are deemed to be better met through a transfer of certain policy competencies to the supranational level, national sovereignty proves to be a stumbling block to be overcome rather than something to be 'jealously guarded'.
A seeming paradox in all of this lies in the fact that, whereas current policy developments occur in Moreover, what is now taking place, in the shift from the national to the supranational level, is not simply 'more of the same'; the shift is qualitative not quantitative. When a group of national governments merge some of their basest inclinations into a supranational framework, the result can exceed the sum total of individual national interests. Instead of supranationalism (and postnationalism), the current harmonisation may thus institute 'supernationalism' or, better, 'hypernationalism' in Europe. This is a nationalism which not only seems to be devoid of nationalists but also prides itself on having outgrown or rationalised petty national concerns in favour of a more universal European common good: in short, an unbounded nationalism busying itself with solving, once and for all, a borderless 'problem' -and all under the protective cloak of unselfish supranational European cooperation.
In this putative post-national order, moreover, governments need be less concerned with their individual reputations, accountabilities and international obligations. At the supranational level, democratic accountability is far weaker. Governments can thus have their cakes and eat them, getting what they want without having to take responsibility or be held accountable to the same extent. While the EU is currently taken to offer new and more rational ways to solve the 'asylum problem', it simultaneously offers governments a way to evade democratic accountability. With all EU governments and the European Commission pulling in roughly the same direction, under the guise of an allegedly benevolent 'European cooperation', this is, arguably, also conducive to an environment in which either the buck is passed or no one needs to assume responsibility for the content and consequences of the policies enacted. It is not surprising that such an environment has been not only a hotbed for a succession of far-reaching proposals on 'unwanted migration' but also highly conducive to the rapid adoption of these proposals by the EU.
A new vanguardism
Cosmopolitans, however, share practically none of the qualms addressed here. Instead, they are busy envisioning all the positive things that might result from national syntheses at the EU level. This vision of a cooperative and thus cosmopolitan 'surplus value' has also found an advocate in Jürgen Habermas -for example, in his jettisoning of his old vision of an EU built democratically from below and endorsing instead one built from above by 'avant-gardist' governments, primarily those of Germany and France, thereby generating a 'momentum' for a common EU foreign policy that other member states 'will not be able to resist in the long run'. While it is made clear that 'there can and must be no separatism', this seems a minor caveat since, once laggard governments see the results of an emerging EU foreign policy, they will realise their best interests and jump on board the 
